








   If you approach the issue of Identity-Over-Time with in mind 
Aristotle’s metaphysics, you will easily realize the interplay of this 
issue with hylomorphism. For an Aristotelian hylomorphist, the 
central question is indeed to know whether it is form or matter (or 
even both) that accounts for the transtemporal identity of our 
common-experience objects. For many reasons too long to explain 
here, Identity-Over-Time viewed from this angle has been a favourite 
subject in the literature concerning Thomas Aquinas. In Aquinas’ 
writings scholars have found many occasions to deal with this issue. 
Only to cite two of the recent works on this matter, in his 2005 book 
Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus Christopher M. Brown paid attention to 
puzzles revolving around the identity of existent material things, the 
substitution of parts and its effect on the definition of the essential 
properties of things1. Some years before Silas N. Langley dedicated a 
                                           
1 See BROWN 2005. On this topic in Aquinas, see also HUGHES 1997; EBERL 2000; 
VAN DYKE 2000; EBERL 2004; STUMP 2006; VAN DYKE 2007; MCDANIEL 2010; STUMP 
2012; VANDEN BOUT 2013. 




detailed dissertation to the identity of human soul after the corruption 
of body2.  
Aquinas addresses the issue of Identity-Over-Time in many 
discussions, including especially the identity of material things and 
artefacts, the identity of the human soul after the corruption of body, 
the identity of the body of Christ in the three days from his death to 
his resurrection and the identity of the resurrected human body at the 
end of time. All these discussions have a point in common: they lead 
Aquinas to raise the question of Identity-Over-Time with respect to 
things that fully exist in act, i.e., things that possess an identity of their 
own and change some of their parts or properties over time while 
continuing to be what they are. In this article I would like to 
investigate this topic from a different angle, considering a case that I 
already introduced in my book on Aquinas on the Beginning and End of 
Human Life, namely the transtemporal identity of things that do not yet 
have an identity of their own or fully exist in act. The case is that of the 
identity of the human embryo through the process of human 
generation3. This case is particularly noteworthy, for two reasons.  
First, it permits the investigation of Identity-Over-Time for the 
case of ephemeral beings, that is, for things that, at a given time, exist 
but do not exist in act in a complete and perfect way. Before the advent 
of the human soul, embryos do not have indeed a stable species and 
                                           
2 See LANGLEY 2002. 




Aquinas underscores this fact by calling embryos «entities that are on 
the way towards the species» (entia in via ad speciem), entities that are 
incessantly changing form and continuously transforming their 
matter4. In this case, the task of defending the transtemporal identity 
of such entities seems to be much more compelling.  
Second, the case of the human embryo permits proving that 
Aquinas provides no explanatory or reductive account of Identity-
Over-Time. Persistence through time is a metaphysically primitive 
feature of our common-experience objects that Aquinas tries to capture 
and clarify but that he appears unable to explain in terms of the 
persistence of more basic item such as matter and/or form. I 
nevertheless resist concluding from this that Aquinas would have 
admitted a radical discontinuity between an embryo and a human 
being to the point that he might have excluded that the person I am 
today be the same person that my embryo was in my mother’s womb5. 
As I shall try to show, Aquinas is of the opinion that, under given 
conditions, a material thing can change its matter and its form while 
continuing to be the same thing. But before to discussing closely the 
identity of the embryo in Aquinas, let me give a brief outline of 
Aquinas’ views on human embryogenesis. 
                                           
4 See AQUINAS 1961 Sum. c. Gent., II, ch. 89, 255, n. 1744: «Nec est inconveniens si 
aliquid intermediorum generatur et statim postmodum interrumpitur: quia inter- 
media non habent speciem completam, sed sunt ut in via ad speciem; et ideo non 
generantur ut permaneant, sed ut per ea ad ultimum generatum perveniatur». 




1. First Question: Is Human Embryogenesis A Formally 
Discontinuous Process? 
   Aquinas’ explanation of human generation is based on the idea that 
generation – unlike other processes such as qualitative alteration, 
quantitative augmentation, and local motion – is a discontinuous 
process. This seems true, at least on the side of form, since the case of 
matter is more complex, as we shall see.  
Aquinas’ embryology is, as expected, largely borrowed from 
Aristotle. The formation of the embryo or fetus – Aquinas uses the two 
terms interchangeably – is the result of the action of the male (the 
father) on the female (the mother) by means of his semen. In terms of 
the four Aristotelian causes, the male is the efficient cause of the 
process, while the mother, through her menstrual blood, is the 
material cause. The semen, on the other hand, is the formal cause, and 
it is in the semen that there exists a vital «spirit» (spiritus), in which is 
found what in the wake of the tradition Aquinas calls the «formative 
power» (virtus formativa). The final cause is the generated human.  
The purpose of the formative power is to modify the menstrual 
blood of the female in the appropriate ways in order to form the body 
of the embryo. Under the stimulus of the formative power, the degree 
of formation and organization of the embryonic matter becomes over 
time gradually more complex and such material development enables 




early stage to another state of ensoulment that is both vegetative and 
sensitive. Finally, the remaining action of the formative power 
advances the process further until the formation of the principal vital 
organs takes place, enabling the embryo to pass from a state of 
vegetative and sensitive ensoulment to a state of ensoulment that is at 
once vegetative, sensitive, and intellective or rational. While Aquinas 
describes the vegetative and sensitive ensoulments as states that are 
drawn out from the potentiality of the female matter, in the sense that 
each reveals a state of actuality or a way of ensoulment that the female 
matter comes to acquire from the moment it is transformed into 
embryonic matter, he portrays the intellective ensoulment as a state 
introduced from outside by a direct act of creation6.  
What is worth noting in this explanation is that Aquinas 
describes the process from vegetative ensoulment to sensitive 
ensoulment and from this to intellective ensoulment as an alternation 
of generations and corruptions, and this could imply that, for Aquinas, 
in the process of human generation there occurs a succession of 
embryos really and numerically distinct from each other. At the onset 
                                           
6 See AQUINAS 1996 Qu. de an., q. 11, ad 1, 102, 310-315: «Et ideo dicendum quod 
anima uegetabilis prius est in semine, set illa abicitur in processu generationis et 
succedit alia que non solum est uegetabilis set etiam sensibilis, qua abiecta iterum 
additur alia que est uegetabilis, sensibilis et rationalis»; see also Quaestio disputata 
de spiritualibus creaturis, a. 3, ad 13. There are many places where Aquinas 
illustrates such a process. For a clear survey, one may see Summa contra Gentiles, II, 





there is an embryo endowed only with vegetative ensoulment; this 
embryo then gets corrupted and a new embryo, endowed then with 
vegetative and sensitive ensoulment, is generated; the same happens 
in the final phase, when the embryo with sensitive ensoulments goes 
out of existence and an embryo endowed then with vegetative, 
sensitive, and intellective ensoulment comes into being7.  
This apparently counter-intuitive description of human 
generation is the logical consequence of the rebuttal of two theses: 
first, the admission of a plurality of really different souls in the human 
embryo and second, the postulation that there exists in the human 
embryo a form that, while remaining one and the same from the 
moment of conception, undergoes a process of perfecting its functions 
over time. If one rejects the doctrine of the plurality of souls and 
denies that generating amounts, for an embryo, to perfecting the 
                                           
7 See e.g. AQUINAS 1961 Sum. c. Gent., II, ch. 89, 254-255, nn. 1743 and 1745: «Licet 
enim generatio simplicium corporum non procedat secundum ordinem, eo quod 
quodlibet eorum habet formam immediatam materiae primae; in generatione 
tamen corporum aliorum, oportet esse generationum ordinem, propter multas 
formas intermedias, inter primam formam elementi et ultimam formam ad quam 
generatio ordinatur. Et ideo sunt multae generationes et corruptiones sese con-
sequentes. (…) Quanto igitur aliqua forma est nobilior et magis distans a forma 
elementi, tanto oportet esse plures formas intermedias, quibus gradatim ad 
formam ultimam veniatur, et per consequens plures generationes medias. Et ideo 
in generatione animalis et hominis in quibus est forma perfectissima, sunt pluri-
mae formae et generationes intermediae, et per consequens corruptiones, quia 
generatio unius est corruptio alterius. Anima igitur vegetabilis, quae primo inest, 
cum embryo vivit vita plantae, corrumpitur, et succedit anima perfectior, quae est 
nutritiva et sensitiva simul, et tunc embryo vivit vita animalis; hac autem corrupta, 





human soul it would have received at conception, then one should not 
be surprised to find Aquinas to deny that there exists a formal 
continuant in the generative process, that is, a form that remains one 
and the same throughout the whole process. Since the species of the 
embryo changes repeatedly and no form, one in number, can belong to 
different species, the embryo cannot exhibit a form that remain 
numerically one and the same throughout the whole process8. But at 
this point, if the species and the form of the embryo change, the 
embryo itself must change as well. In the case of human embryos, the 
problem of the Identity-Over-Time precisely lies on this puzzle: on the 
one hand, generation works out to be a formally discontinuous 
process, and for this reason one cannot say that it is one and 
numerically the same embryo that becomes a human being; but on the 
other hand, if it were not one and numerically the same embryo that 
becomes a human being, one could not assert at all that a human being 
is generated from the very same embryo that has been conceived.  
The solution that the interpreters of Aquinas commonly give to 
this puzzle is that the process of human generation, although formally 
discontinuous, is nonetheless materially continuous. This is a perfectly 
                                           
8  See AQUINAS 1961 Sum. c. Gent., II, ch. 89, 254-255, n. 1743: «Species tamen 
formati non manet eadem: nam primo habet forma seminis, postea sanguinis, et 
sic inde quosque veniat ad ultimum complementum» and AQUINAS 1988 Sum. 
theol., Ia, q. 118, a. 2, ad 2, 548: «Non est autem possibile ut una et eadem forma 
numero sit diversarum specierum»; Ia–IIae, q. 67, a. 3, 829: «Unum et idem numero 




reasonable answer and makes good sense of many of Aquinas’ claims. 
But how are we to understand the continuity of matter? In order to 
answer this further question, we have first to clarify which matter 
could be responsible for the identity of the subject of human 
generation (whether individual matter or common matter) and second, 
to explain how matter could do this job given that every process of 
identification of things, whether on the metaphysical or on the 
cognitive level, requires a form. At first, someone could reject the 
continuity of the process also on the side of matter on the argument 
that since we are after all dealing with a process of generation, it is 
obvious that there can be nothing, either on the side of form or on that 
of matter, that remains exactly as it is from the start of the process to 
its end. Aquinas himself thinks that one should not be surprised that 
the process of generation is not continuous9. Otherwise, it would be 
indistinguishable from a process of nourishment or growth, for in this 
case there would be a subject that is already generated in act from the 
moment of conception. But the surprise all the same remains, for it is 
undeniable that the process of generation, even if one admits of 
differentiated sub-processes of generation and corruption, is on the 
whole a process that takes place without interruption (of the process 
                                           
9 See AQUINAS 1961 Sum. c. Gent., II, ch. 89, 255, n. 1744: «Nec est mirum si tota 
generationis transmutatio non est continua, sed sunt multae generationes interme-
diae: quia hoc etiam accidit in alteratione et augmento; non enim est tota alteratio 
continua, neque totum augmentum, sed solum motus localis est vere continuus, ut 




itself as well as of the subject of the process), and therefore a certain 
continuity of the process and of the subject must be conceded10. Well, 
if form is unable to account for the continuity of human generation, it 
remains that only matter can fulfill this task. But how can matter do it? 
2. Second Question: Is Human Embryogenesis A Materially 
Continuous Process? 
   When reconstructing Aquinas’s solution to the “puzzle of the 
embryo”, the first step is to investigate what criteria Aquinas himself 
has given for establishing the identity of a thing. As it turns out, this 
investigation is particularly arduous, since in his works Aquinas 
formulates quite diverse sets of criteria. In addition, such criteria are 
not always formulated uniformly and, moreover, they are applicable, 
strictly speaking, only to things that already exist in act. As said, 
Aquinas discusses the question of whether the human body is 
numerically the same after the human soul departed from it, or 
whether the human body remains numerically the same at the 
moment of the final resurrection at the end of time. These questions 
are meaningful since they are asking about the identity between two 
things – two bodies – that, at different times, exist in act. Similarly, 
Aquinas at times asks if Socrates and this white thing are the same 
entity, and again the question makes sense since ‘Socrates’ and ‘this 
white thing’ refer to things that, at the same time, exist in act. But in 
                                           
10 Aquinas argues for the interconnection of continuity (unity) of a process and of 




the case of an embryo, any criterion of identity seems to fail. For 
example, when we ask if a given embryo and a given human being are 
numerically the same thing, the question does not seem germane, 
since Aquinas conceives of the embryo as something that does not 
exist in act in a perfect and complete way. As a result, if before the 
advent of the rational soul no embryo can be given once and for all, 
one could not even put the question whether the embryo is 
numerically the same or numerically different from the human being 
that follows from it. 
In order to avoid this unfitting result, someone could propose a 
different criterion for stating the identity between an embryo and a 
human being: two things can be said to be the same thing if the second 
comes from the first. This characterization could apply well to the case 
of a human being: a human being could be called the same thing that a 
given embryo precisely because a human being comes from a given 
embryo. As is clear, a criterion of this sort is independent from the 
answer one gives to the question of the continuity of matter; it 
provides a general criterion for establishing the identity of an embryo. 
Because of this generality, however, this criterion seems to be of little 
help, for it gives us a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
establishing the identity of an embryo. Indeed, it does not differentiate 




table can be said to come from the wood of a tree, but the table and the 
tree cannot be called for this reason the same thing.  
The case of the embryo is more complex. In this case, it is not 
enough to say that a human being comes from an embryo, but we 
should at the very least say that an embryo becomes a human being, 
while we cannot say of a tree that it becomes a table. In other words, a 
simple ‘principle of traceability’ – by which it would be possible to 
follow and establish the identity of a changing subject in whatever 
phase of the process of change once the rule of change is known – 
could be insufficient to establish the identity of an embryo within a 
process of generation. In the case of embryos we also have to require 
that the final form, which is the goal of generation, regulate all the 
preceding phases in such a way that each one of the preceding phases 
causally determines and orders the immediately following phase of 
the process toward the subsequent phases and the final form. This 
teleology is what significantly distinguishes the case of an embryo 
becoming a human being from that of a table coming from the wood of 
a tree. As we shall say later on, it gives us the sufficient condition for 
establishing the identity of an embryo throughout the process of 
generation.  
Of course, one could still insist that a principle of traceability is 
all the same sufficient at least for ascertaining the identity of an embryo 




identity of an embryo, we are supposed to look for something less 
extrinsic and less knowledge-dependent, that is, we are supposed to 
want to establish what, within the embryo, grants this traceability, 
and, in Aristotelian terms, if this is its form and/or its matter. Thus, 
someone could attempt to verify if, despite Aquinas’ claims, there is 
room to a certain degree for defending the view that form is the factor 
responsible for the identity of the embryo over time. The argument 
could be the following.  
As has been said, Aquinas adopts a model for the phenomenon 
of generation that describes the succession of forms as replacement. The 
embryo exercises at the beginning of the process only vegetative 
functions. But right from the start, such functions are oriented toward 
properly predisposing matter to support the exercise of the highest 
intellective functions of soul. When the embryo’s matter becomes 
much more organized, the embryo begins to exercise also sensitive 
functions. The principle of its sensitive ensoulment is the same as that 
of its vegetative ensoulment, such that the functions that the embryo 
was exercising when it had only a vegetative ensoulment are 
formally—and allegedly numerically—the same as those it exercises 
when it possesses a sensitive ensoulment. The sensitive soul not only 
replaces the vegetative soul, but also reabsorbs its functions, so that the 
sensitive soul exercises both the vegetative functions that the 




with the passing from sensitive to rational soul, even if in this case the 
rational soul is introduced from outside, as said.  
Given this scheme, the passage from embryo to human being 
may be presented in such a way that it implies that there must be one 
and the same subject that undergoes a process of progressive 
enrichment of functions. No doubt that, for Aquinas, the embryo’s 
vital functions depend on really distinct souls, but each soul that 
supervenes in the process of generation, replacing the preceding, 
incorporates into itself the functions exercised by the preceding soul, 
so that those functions seem to remain exactly as they were in the 
preceding ensoulment of the embryo. From this perspective, beyond 
an assumed material continuity (which still has to be proved), the 
continuity of the embryo could also be defended on the part of the 
form by invoking the continuity of certain primordial vital functions. 
The identity of such functions, combined with a certain identity of the 
matter, could be taken as what allows us to establish the identity of the 
embryo throughout the process of generation.  
At first sight, this suggestion has its plausibility, but on closer 
look there are some problems with it. To bring these to light, we must 
seek a deeper understanding of how Aquinas characterizes the notion 
of identity.  
2.1. Is Human Embryogenesis A Process Concerning A Thing 




   There are many texts where Aquinas dwells on the identity between 
two things. For the sake of brevity, let me consider here only one of 
them, which is particularly significant for the present issue. Aristotle 
reserves chapter 9 of book V of the Metaphysics to clarifying the 
meaning of the terms “identical”, “diverse”, “similar” and 
“dissimilar”. Commenting on this chapter, Aquinas explains that, 
fundamentally, identity expresses a form of unity or union. Two 
things can be called “identical” in one sense if, though they each have 
their own being, they have some property in common or, in a second 
sense, if, sharing the same being, they can be considered as different 
terms of a relation of identity11. An embryo and a human being cannot 
be said to be identical in this second sense, so, if one speaks of identity 
in their case, it must be in the first sense. If identity can be explained as 
a kind of unity, the ways in which two things are per se identical can be 
reduced to the ways in which two things are per se one. Aquinas lists 
four cases in which two things x and y can be said to be per se one:  
[i] if the matter of x is specifically identical to the matter of y;  
[ii] if the matter of x is numerically identical to the matter of y;  
[iii] if there is a substantial continuity between x and y;  
                                           
11 See AQUINAS 1964 Exp. Met., V, lec. 11, 245, n. 912: «Ex hoc autem ulterius 
concludit, quod identitas est unitas vel unio; aut ex eo quod illa quae dicuntur 
idem, sunt plura secundum esse, et tamen dicuntur idem in quantum in aliquo 
uno conveniunt. Aut quia sunt unum secundum esse, sed intellectus utitur eo ut 




[iv] if x and y share a single and indivisible concept (ratio).12  
Regarding this four-part division, an embryo and a human being 
cannot be identical in the fourth way [iv], for the concept of a human 
being cannot be extended to an embryo, at least until it has received 
the rational soul. A human embryo and a human being cannot be 
called human in the same sense, for Aquinas. There is no doubt that for 
Aquinas an embryo becomes a human being at about one month and 
half of gestation13. In any case, this way of union concerns the form 
and, as has been seen, Aquinas excludes that there is continuity of 
form in the process of generation.  
Discarding this way, we might then say that an embryo and a 
human being are identical in the second sense [ii]: they are one 
because they have the same matter in number. But unfortunately this 
too cannot be said. An embryo and a human being do not have exactly 
the same pieces of matter or even the same quantity of matter, that is, 
the same individual matter with the very same extension. They do not 
                                           
12 See AQUINAS 1964 Exp. Met., V, lec. 11, 245, n. 911: «Deinde cum dicit ‘alia vero’ 
ponit modos eiusdem per se; et dicit, quod aliqua dicuntur eadem secundum se 
eisdem modis, quibus dicitur unum per se. Omnes enim modi, quibus aliqua 
unum per se dicuntur, reducuntur ad duos: quorum [i] unus est secundum quod 
dicuntur unum illa, quorum materia est una; sive accipiamus materiam eandem 
secundum speciem, [ii] sive secundum numerum; ad quod pertinet secundus et 
tertius modus unius. [iii] Alio modo dicuntur unum, quorum substantia est una: 
vel ratione continuitatis, quod pertinet ad primum modum: [iv] vel propter 
unitatem et indivisibilitatem rationis, quod pertinet ad quartum et quintum. Unde 
et his modis dicuntur aliqua esse idem» (numbering in the texts is my own). 




have the same quantity of matter, because after the coming of 
vegetative soul, the process of generation becomes a process of bodily 
growth, of differentiation and formation of the vital organs. The 
argument Aquinas occasionally uses for proving the numerical 
difference between the father and the child – i.e. a human being does 
not generate a numerically identical human being since the generating 
and the generated do not share numerically the same matter14 – can 
also be applied to the case of an embryo and a generated human being. 
If the matter of an embryo and that of a human being are not 
numerically the same, not even are the embryo and the human being 
numerically the same.  
Nevertheless, one could note that the view that an embryo 
increases its matter in the process of generation could not be 
incompatible with the view that an embryo possesses an original 
nucleus of matter that endures as it is through generation. If not the 
quantity of matter, some portion of unchanged matter could be what 
provides the material continuant of the embryo. This is reasonable, but 
as we shall see shortly, Aquinas rejects this second view also. What is 
more, Aquinas distinguishes between “identity of subject” and 
“identity of matter”, admitting that a thing can change all its material 
parts without ceasing to be the same thing in number. We 
                                           
14 See e.g. Scriptum super Sententiis, II, d. 20, q. 2, a. 3; De principiis naturae, ch. 4; 




continuously change our matter from the beginning to the end of our 
life, just like a river or a fire – taking Aquinas’ examples –change 
continuously its water or its wood while continuing to be the same 
river and the same fire. In the case of river and fire, it is their form that, 
remaining one and the same in number, provides river and fire with 
numerical identity15.  
While discussing a different example, i.e. that of a city (civitas), 
Aquinas makes the difference between “identity of subject” and 
“identity of matter” clearer. He observes that the material parts of a 
thing can be substituted freely, but two conditions must however be 
respected to safeguard the numerical identity of the thing. First, the 
substitution of material parts must preserve the functions that were 
carried out by the parts that have been substituted, and for this reason 
a genuine substitution of parts can take place only using matter that is 
functionally homogeneous16. Second, the substitution of material parts 
                                           
15 See AQUINAS 1952, Exp. Meteor., II, lec. 6, 469-470, n. 170: «Secundum est, quod 
movet dubitationem, de qua oportet primo videre veritatem, antequam proposi-
tum manifestet. Et est ista quaestio: utrum partes maris semper maneant eaedem 
numero; aut permutentur secundum numerum, et maneant eaedem secundum 
quantitatem, sicut accidit in aere et in aqua potabili fluminum et in igne. In his 
enim omnibus partes fiunt aliae et aliae numero, sed species vel forma multi-
tudinis harum partium manet eadem: et hoc apparet maxime in aquis fluentibus et 
in fluxu flammae, quae per successionem fumi semper innovatur, ut supra dictum 
est, et tamen flamma semper manet eadem in numero». 
16 See e.g. AQUINAS 2013 Sup. Sent., IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, q.la 4: «Tertia autem opinio 
(…) ponit omnes partes quae non sunt praeter intentionem naturae aggeneratae 
pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae quantum ad id quod habent de specie, 




must take place in succession, part after part, and not simultaneously, 
all at once17.  
Normally, in the case of human beings, the substitution of 
complex vital parts, such as organs or the proper parts of the human 
body (like hands, legs, and so on), can come about only artificially by 
means of medical interventions, while the substitution of non-complex 
and homogeneous material parts, such as flesh and bones, comes 
about naturally, by nutrition. For our argument, the first kind of 
substitution is less important, for it concerns parts that are already 
ensouled and therefore functionally defined on form; so we may set it 
aside. The second kind is instead important for it brings to light 
Aquinas’ conviction that the constitutive matter of a human being can 
                                                                                                                               
unt et refluunt indifferenter. Ut ita etiam intelligamus contingere in partibus 
hominis unius sicut contingit in tota multitudine civitatis, quia singuli subtra-
huntur a multitudine per mortem, aliis in locum eorum succedentibus; unde 
partes multitudinis fluunt et refluunt materialiter, sed formaliter manent, quia ad 
eadem officia et ordines substituuntur alii, a quibus priores subtrahebantur; unde 
respublica una numero manere dicitur. Et similiter etiam dum quibusdam par-
tibus fluentibus aliae reparantur in eadem figura et in eodem situ, omnes partes 
fluunt et refluunt secundum materiam, sed manent secundum speciem; manet 
nihilominus unus homo numero».  
17 See e.g. AQUINAS 1988 Sum. theol., Ia, q. 119, a. 1, ad 5, 552: «Ad quintum 
dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in I de Generat., quando aliqua materia per 
se convertitur in ignem, tunc dicitur ignis de novo generari: quando vero aliqua 
materia convertitur in ignem praeexistentem, dicitur ignis nutriri. Unde si tota 
materia simul amittat speciem ignis, et alia materia convertatur in ignem, erit alius 
ignis numero. Si vero, paulatim combusto uno ligno, aliud substituatur, et sic 
deinceps quousque omnia prima consumantur, semper remanet idem ignis nu-
mero: quia semper quod additur, transit in praeexistens. Et similiter est 
intelligendum in corporibus viventibus, in quibus ex nutrimento restauratur id 




be continuously destroyed by the vital heat and substituted with other 
matter introduced by food. There are many places where Aquinas 
introduces this point, but the clearest one is when he discusses the 
question «whether food truly converts itself into human nature»18.  
In the part of his Sentences Commentary where he discusses this 
question (II, d. 30), Aquinas recalls that in his day there were two 
positions concerning the material continuity of a human being. The 
first advocated the view that all the matter of a human being is already 
contained in the very first embryonic matter (just as all the matter of 
the human genus was contained in the embryonic matter of the first 
human being), and this to such an extent that what rises at the final 
judgment has exactly that amount of matter and no other. This 
position assumed that the matter introduced through food only serves 
to maintain, by counterbalancing the vital heat, the amount of 
primordial matter, but does not add any new matter to the organism19.  
                                           
18 See e.g. Scriptum super Sententiis, II, d. 30, q. 2; IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, q.1a 4; Summa 
theologiae, Ia, q. 119, a. 1. For a detailed reconstruction of Aquinas’s solution to this 
question, see AMERINI 2013, ch. 5, esp. 137–146. 
19 See AQUINAS 1929 Sup. Sent., II, d. 30, q. 2, a. 1, vol. 2, 778: «Quidam posuerunt, 
ut in Littera Magister sentire videtur, quod illud quod ex parentibus decisum est, 
est illud in quo veritas hujus nati consistit. Hoc autem in majorem quantitatem 
excrescit omnino salvatum, ita quod nihil sibi additur, ut majorem quantitatem 
recipiat; sed tota quantitas hominis completi per multiplicationem illius materiae 
efficitur: et hoc tantum esse dicunt quod in resurrectione resurget; reliquum autem 
quasi superfluum deponetur. Ponunt etiam alimenti sumptionem necessariam 
esse, non quidem ad augmentum ut nutritiva augmentativae deser- viat, neque 




The second position, while sharing with the first the view that 
the matter of a human being is already entirely contained in the 
embryonic primordial matter, differed from the first in that it held that 
such an amount of matter can be increased thanks to the matter that is 
introduced through food, although the “added” matter does not 
remain exactly as it is throughout the whole life of a human being20. 
Both positions shared the belief that there is a primitive nucleus of 
matter that remains numerically stable for the whole duration of a 
human being’s life and guarantees one’s bodily continuity at the final 
resurrection. In his reply, Aquinas attacks precisely this belief. 
The reason to reject the first position is quickly explained. That 
something increases in matter implies that it modifies its dimensions. 
There are then only two possible cases: either the quantity of matter 
with modified dimensions is the same or greater. If it is the same 
(putting aside whether the extension of matter comes about naturally 
or through divine intervention), the process of increase becomes a 
process of rarefaction, and this evidently cannot be stated for the case 
in question. If instead the quantity of matter is greater, then either the 
                                           
20 Ibid., 782: «Et ideo aliorum positio est, concedentium quidem cum primis quod 
aliquid est in humano corpore, et similiter in aliis corporibus quae nu-triuntur, 
quod quidem semper manet fixum toto tempore vitae, secundum deter-minatam 
partem materiae, in quo principaliter veritatem humanae naturae con-sistere 
dicunt; aliquid autem est aliud quod superfluit et refluit, id est advenit et 
consumitur: hoc autem est quod ex cibo generatum est. Differunt tamen a primis 
in hoc quod dicunt sumptionem alimenti non solum in fomentum caloris naturalis 




added matter is created from nothing or there is a different matter that 
is added. The first possibility is excluded, because what can be 
accounted for naturally should not be explained by recourse to God’s 
intervention, and also because God has created the matter of all things 
all at once. From here the conclusion: there is a matter that has been 
added and this matter comes from the introduction of food21. 
What Aquinas sees wrong in the opponent’s position is the claim 
that prime matter can become a substance by being appropriately 
extended – a claim based on the belief that prime matter, being 
deprived of any form, is in potency to all possible forms. Aquinas 
gives two reasons to reject this claim. First, prime matter cannot give 
rise to a substance thanks to extension, but, rather, thanks to quantity, 
on which extension ultimately depends. Thus, if prime matter changes 
extension, it must also change quantity to a certain degree, and this 
entail that it must change matter as well, since quantity is related to a 
certain amount of matter. Second, prime matter can in principle 
acquire all forms, but when it begins to acquire a form in particular, 
then that form requires a sequence of accidental determinations such 
that each member in the series determines the next in order for the 
form to be realized. This implies that prime matter cannot receive any 
extension whatsoever. From all that Aquinas concludes that it is 
                                           




impossible to postulate a portion of primordial matter that remains 
exactly as it is for the whole lifetime of a human being22.  
To be sure, these arguments against the first position do not 
completely exclude the possibility that some primordial matter, albeit 
modified, could remain for the entire duration of the human’s life. The 
reply given to the second position, however, excludes this possibility. 
Aquinas argues that the activity of nutrition consists not only in the 
increase of matter and counterbalance of the vital heat, but also in the 
replacement of material parts destroyed by the vital heat associated 
with digestive activity. It would be inconsistent to think that some 
matter is corrupted and that no matter is added, given that the 
quantity of matter does not decrease. It is therefore impossible that 
there could remain unaltered a primitive nucleus of matter endowed 
with what the medical doctors in the age of Aquinas called «radical 
moisture» (humidum radicale). By this latter notion, doctors designated 
a special organic state, the one that enables matter to counterbalancing 
the destructive activity of vital heat. Aquinas is of the opinion that the 
organic state associated with the radical moisture cannot remain 
exactly as it is in the human being, but only as appropriately modified 
and combined with more complex forms of moisture. Hence, again, it 
                                           




is untenable that there could remain unaltered a primitive nucleus of 
matter endowed with radical moisture23.  
Aquinas’ conclusion does not leave room for doubt: there is 
nothing of the individual matter of a thing, as taken under some 
quantitative dimensions, that remains exactly as it is throughout the 
entire process of human generation24. As a result, if one makes the 
numerical identity of a thing depend on its individual matter25, one 
must conclude that no numerical identity can hold between an embryo 
and a human being. 
2.2. Is Human Embryogenesis A Process Concerning A Thing 
That Is Materially One In Species? 
   The persistence of the same matter in number is difficult to be 
defended in the case of human embryo, nevertheless there is a short 
passage from an early work, the Quaestiones de veritate (belonging to 
                                           
23 Ibid., 782–784. 
24 Ibid., 784–785: «Tertia positio est quam ponit Averroes, in I De gener., comment. 
35, dicens quod nihil materiae potest accipi in corpore signatum, quod sit fixum et 
permanens; sed totum quidquid est in corpore potest dupliciter con- siderari: vel 
ex parte materiae, et sic non est permanens; vel ex parte formae et speciei, et sic est 
permanens. Comparat enim Aristoteles, in I De gener., text. 35, transmutationem 
cibi in carnem adustioni lignorum. Videmus enim quod si ignis accendatur, et 
continue ligna addantur, secundum quod alia consumuntur, forma ignis semper 
manebit in lignis, sed tamen materia quaelibet consumitur, alia ma-teria sibi 
succedente, in qua species ignis salvabitur; et secundum hoc, etiam illud quod 
pertinet ad speciem et formam carnis semper manebit, quamvis illud quod recipit 
hanc formam, continue consumatur et restauretur. (…) Et huic positioni inter 
omnes magis consentio sine praejudicio aliarum». 
25 In support of this thesis, see for example AQUINAS 1992, Sup. De Trin., q. 4, a. 2, 




the first Parisian stay of Thomas in 1256-1259), where Aquinas 
explicitly states that a formed embryo and the unensouled embryo are 
not numerically different26. From this one may infer that since only 
matter is responsible for numerical differentiation in Aquinas’ 
metaphysics, then if a formed embryo and the unensouled embryo are 
not numerically different, they must have the same matter. With 
respect to the four-part division mentioned above, this text from the 
Quaestiones de veritate could redirect us to the first way [i], i.e., that a 
human embryo and a human being are one because they have the 
same matter in species. But this response seems also not to succeed. 
There are at least two reasons that lead us to rule it out.  
First, the persistence of the type of matter is a necessary and 
possibly sufficient condition for asserting the identity of the type of a 
material thing, but such persistence seems to be insufficient to prove 
the persistence of any individual token of that type. If an embryo is 
constituted of flesh and bones and it does not lose this type of matter, 
this fact permits saying that such an embryo continues to be an 
embryo of the same type, i.e. human, until it is made of flesh and 
bones. But it does not permit saying that it is precisely the same 
                                           
26 Cf. AQUINAS 1972 Qu. de ver., q. 14, a. 7, ad 6, 457–458, 139–145: «Ad sextum 
dicendum quod fides informis et formata non dicuntur diversa in genere quasi in 
diversis generibus existentia, sed sicut perfectum quod attingit ad rationem gene- 
ris et imperfectum quod nondum attingit; unde non oportet quod numero 




embryo in number, with precisely this flesh and these bones, as that 
which is the subject of the process of generation.  
Second, the matter of a human being is (perfectly) organic 
matter, while the embryo has a matter that is non-organic (or, at least, 
not yet perfectly organic), and hence the two matters cannot be 
specifically one and the same. At a later stage in the process, when the 
flesh and bones are fully formed, this criterion might work, but at the 
start of the generative process it cannot give an account of the identity 
between a not-yet-formed embryo and a human being. The problem 
here is that flesh and bones are formed only with the coming of the 
rational soul, when the embryo is no longer an embryo but has become 
by then a human being. Before the advent of human soul in the body, 
Aquinas says that the matter of the embryo is only a disposition to 
human matter 27 . This claim has an important implication. Since 
Aquinas often relates the numerical identity of a thing to the identity 
of the essential principles of that thing28, the fact that the essential 
                                           
27 See AQUINAS 1988, Sum. theol., IIIa, q. 5, a. 3, 1896: «Caro enim et ceterae partes 
hominis per animam speciem sortiuntur. Unde, recedente anima, non est os aut 
caro nisi aequivoce, ut patet per Philosophum, II de Anima, et VII Metaphys.»; a. 4, 
1897: «Cum enim corpus proportionetur animae sicut materia propriae formae, 
non est vera caro humana quae non est perfecta anima humana, scilicet rationali»; 
q. 6, a. 4, ad 1, 1900: «Caro humana sortitur esse per animam. Et ideo ante 
adventum animae non est caro humana: sed potest esse dispositio ad carnem 
humanam».  
28 See e.g. AQUINAS 1996 Quodl., XI, q. 6, vol. 1, 160–161, 34-44: «Dicendum quod, 
ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem numero, requiritur ydemptitas principiorum 
essencialium; unde, quodcunque principiorum essencialium etiam in ipso in- 




principles of a human being are not yet present in the embryo – given 
that the embryo, properly speaking, has neither a human soul nor a 
human body – lead one to say that, for Aquinas, no numerical identity 
can hold between an unensouled embryo and a human being. At the 
end of our investigation about the identity of embryo’s matter, the 
conclusion is rather discouraging: neither individual matter nor 
specific matter can account for the transtemporal identity of a human 
embryo. What therefore about the identity of an embryo and a human 
being? 
2.3. Is Human Embryogenesis A Process Concerning A Thing 
That Is One In Being? 
   There seems to remain only the third way [iii] of accounting for the 
supposed identity of an embryo, and the substantial continuity 
between an embryo and a human being could restore the sense of 
identity that we are seeking. As a first approximation, two things x 
and y could be said to be substantially continuous if there is a 
continuity of a subject that from x becomes y. We have already 
examined this characterization and seen that it is not sufficient. One 
however could try to refine the concept of substantial continuity 
holding that in the case of an embryo and a human being substantial 
                                                                                                                               
essenciale cuiuslibet indiuidui quod est de ratione ipsius indiuidui, sicut cuiuslibet 
rei sunt essencialia materia et forma; unde, si accidencia uarientur et mutentur, 





continuity is given by the fact that x and y share one and the same 
being. To share one and the same being can be understood 
synchronically or diachronically, and it is evident that an embryo and 
a human being could only be said to share one and the same being in 
the second way. Sharing one and the same being could guarantee that 
beyond the formal and material modifications of a subject, one has 
always to do with one and the same subject.  
Unfortunately, even this refinement of the condition for 
substantial continuity seems unable to resolve completely the question 
of the identity of the embryo, and this for two reasons. First, for 
Aquinas the being of a thing depends on the form, and so if a thing 
changes its form, it then also changes its being. Second, the simple 
appeal to the continuity and existential story of a thing seems to not be 
an appropriately explanatory condition for it fails to explain why a 
thing remains one and the same throughout its existential story: a 
thing could be modified so radically as to be no longer recognizable, to 
the point that no one would say that it is the same thing, even though 
that thing never ceased to exist and the process of modification were 
uninterrupted. Sharing one and the same being, therefore, appears to 
be a condition that is still too extrinsic to x and y. Identity must be 
proved in some other way. Certainly, existential continuity can be 
taken as a sign of the continuity of a thing over time, but from that one 




thing. One senses that even the criterion of substantial continuity is 
inadequate to account for the identity of an embryo within a 
generative process. So, where do we go from here? 
3. Discontinuity of Embryogenesis vs. Continuity of the 
Embryo 
   We have little leeway at this point. As it seems, we have only two 
possibilities: either we admit the radical discontinuity of the process of 
generation, the impossibility of finding in Aquinas a link between a 
human being and the embryo from which s/he derives, or we attempt 
to find out in Aquinas a different argument for the identity of the 
embryo. In order to exclude the first option, let me explore the 
feasibility of the second one. Until now we have established that, for 
Aquinas, neither matter (individual or specific) nor form is able to 
explain the identity over time of an embryo, so the identity of the 
subject of human generation can be proved independently of whether 
the identity of its matter or form is proved. Aquinas himself seems 
willing to keep “identity of matter” and “identity of subject” distinct. 
In the case of the relics of saints, for example, Aquinas concedes the 
former but not the latter:  
the dead body of a saint is not numerically identical with what it 
was before when it was living on account of the diversity of form, 
which is the soul; nevertheless it is identical by an identity of matter, 
which is once again to be united to its form29.  
                                           
29 See AQUINAS 1988 Sum. theol., IIIa, q. 25, a. 6, ad 3, 1992: «Ad tertium dicen-dum 





This text induces us to think that, for Aquinas, a given matter 
can be one and the same even if it is no longer the matter of one and 
the same subject in number and that a subject can be one and the same 
even if it no longer has anything of its matter. Applying this 
distinction to the case of the embryo, one could hold that there is 
identity of subject but not identity of matter. Establishing the identity 
of subject without referring to the identity of matter seems possible, 
but proving the converse looks difficult. How can we fix the identity of 
matter prescinding from the identity of subject?  
A first solution could be that of relating the identity of matter to 
the identity of the apparent accidents, such as extension, three-
dimensionality and so on. But this answer tends to complicate rather 
to solve the problem, for, as is known, Aquinas refuses to admit the 
pre-existence of accidental features or dispositions of matter before the 
coming of the substantial form, namely the coming of the human soul 
into the body. For our purposes we can avoid to linger here on the role 
played by the determinate/ indeterminate dimensions in Aquinas’ 
theory of substantial individuation30. What is worth noting here is 
that, even conceding the pre-existence of accidental dispositions of 
                                                                                                                               
dum viveret, propter diversitatem formae, quae est anima: est tamen idem 
identitate materiae, quae est iterum suae formae unienda». The phrase “identity of 
matter” (identitas materiae) recurs only twice in Aquinas’s writings: for the second 
occurrence, see Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 119, a. 1, arg. 5 and ad 5, in the context of 
the discussion of the material identity of man across his life. 




matter before the coming of substantial form, there is at least a text 
where Aquinas casts serious doubts on the possibility of establishing 
the identity of matter – by appealing to the identity of the accidental 
dispositions of matter – independently of the identity of subject. In 
Quodlibet I, a text dating, according to René-Antoine Gauthier, to the 
Advent of 1269, when discussing the question «once the soul is united 
to the body, are all the forms that once inhered in it, both substantial 
and accidental, corrupted?», Aquinas seems to revise his earlier 
position and to reject the hypothesis that some accidental forms can be 
conceptually presupposed (praeintellectae) to the substantial form and 
survive after the separation of the substantial form from the body. As 
he argues, the indeterminate dimensions that a body has when the 
human soul has been infused into it remain specifically and not 
numerically identical to those the body had or will have when it was 
or will be, respectively, not yet or no longer ensouled 31 . Maybe 
Aquinas came to realize here the difficulty of reconciling the radical 
primacy of substantial form with the possibility of defining the 
                                           
31  See AQUINAS 1996 Quodl., I, q. 4, a. 1, vol. 2, 183–184, 47–94: «Responsio. 
Dicendum quod inpossibile est in uno et eodem esse plures formas substanciales. 
(…) Manifestum est autem quod semper, adueniente forma perfecta, tollitur forma 
inperfecta, sicut et adueniente figura pentagoni, tollitur figura quadrati. Vnde dico 
quod, adueniente anima humana, tollitur forma substancialis que prius inerat, 
alioquin generatio esset sine corruptione alterius, quod est inpossibile. Forme uero 
accidentales que prius inerant disponentes ad animam, corrumpuntur quidem non 
per se, set per accidens ad corruptionem subiecti, unde manent eedem specie, set 
non eedem numero, sicut etiam contingit circa dispositiones formarum ele- 




numerical identity of matter’s dimensions independently of the subject 
of which they are the dimensions. In this case, Aquinas acknowledges 
that one cannot define the numerical identity of a thing and of any 
material part and aspect of it independently of the substantial form. 
This entails that one may infer that the dimensions of a body can be 
said to be numerically identical only insofar as they are the 
dimensions of a numerically identical subject. Since once the form 
ceases to be, the numerical identity of the subject also ceases, it follows 
that, once the form ceases to be, the numerical identity of the 
dimensions ceases also.  
The same argument could be reformulated with respect to the 
case of the functions exerted by the embryonic matter. At the 
beginning of this article we observed that the identity of some 
primordial functions, combined with a certain identity of matter, could 
be taken as what allows us to state the identity of the subject of the 
process of generation. The hypothesis of the identity of certain generic 
functions that gradually become more specific when the embryonic 
matter gradually becomes more organized seems to account rather 
well for the numerical identity between an embryo and a human 
being, like Aquinas himself suggested in Quaestiones de veritate. 
Unfortunately, Aquinas devotes little space to explaining concretely 
the working of the mechanism of replacement of forms and of 




preceding form. But if we take into account how Aquinas treats the 
reverse process of the separation of the substantial form from the body 
and the gradual ceasing of vital functions, it turns out to be very 
arduous to preserve the numerical identity of the subject within the 
process of generation. In fact, once the property “being rational” is lost 
– Aquinas argues –, the human body that still lives cannot be said to 
be the same body in number, but only in genus32.  
Again, if we apply this analysis to the case of the embryo, the 
hope of preserving the numerical identity of some primordial 
embryonic functions and of understanding that as an expression of the 
numerical identity of the embryo vanishes. The vegetative and 
sensitive functions carried out by an embryo before the advent of the 
rational soul and the same functions carried out by a human being 
after the coming of the rational soul are not numerically the same, but 
they are the same only in genus, which is to say very little, for neither 
do there exist such things as generic vital functions that can be set 
apart from the specific vital functions, nor does the type of functioning 
and the degree of perfecting of such functions turns out to be exactly 
the same in number before and after the advent of the rational soul33. 
                                           
32 See e.g. AQUINAS 1988 Sum. theol., Ia-IIae, q. 67, a. 5, ad 1, 831: «Ad primum ergo 
dicendum quod, remoto rationali, non remanet vivum idem numero, sed idem 
genere». For other references and further discussion, see AMERINI 2013, ch. 5, esp. 
146–163; AMERINI 2015. 
33 See e.g. AQUINAS 1929 Sup. Sent., II, d. 18, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4, vol. 2, 471–472: «Sed 




Working from what Aquinas offers us in his texts, no solid 
biological basis seems therefore available for defining the generic 
identity between a yet-not-formed embryo and a human being. As a 
matter of fact, the only tool to which Aquinas resorts to account for the 
identity of the subject of human generation is metaphysical rather than 
biological, and rests on the notions of potency and act. The fact that the 
embryo is that which, once the process of generation is set in motion, 
naturally and necessarily becomes a human being and that the human-
form is what, as the goal or end to which the process tends, 
retrospectively drives the entire process of generation, permits one to 
look upon the embryo as what is a human being in potency and upon 
a human being as what embryo is, but in act. As a consequence, the 
identity of the subject of human generation can simply be stated from 
the stipulation that what is in potency and what is in act must be one 
and the same subject (in number)34. Potency and act entail one and the 
                                                                                                                               
hoc processu sunt plurimae generationes et corruptiones, sicut quod semen 
convertitur in sanguinem, et sic deinceps: quando venitur ad secundam perfe- 
ctionem, prima perfectio non manet eadem numero, sed acquiritur simul cum 
acquisitione secundae; et sic patet quod in infusione animae rationalis homo simul 
consequitur in una essentia animae animam sensitivam et vegetativam; et priores 
perfectiones non manent eaedem numero»; AQUINAS 1988 Sum. theol., Ia, q. 118, a. 
2, ad 2, 548: «Sic igitur dicendum est quod anima intellectiva creatur a Deo in fine 
generationis humanae, quae simul est et sensitiva et nutritiva, corruptis for-mis 
praexistentibus». 
34 See AQUINAS 1964 Exp. Met., VIII, lec. 5, 421, n. 1767: «Ultima materia, quae 
scilicet est appropriata ad formam, et ipsa forma sunt idem. Aliud enim eorum est 




same subject simply because it is presupposed that what is in potency 
is the same as what is in act. Such seems to be, in the end, the only 
identity that can be acknowledged between an embryo and a human 
being35.  
4. Identity Between What Is In Potency And What Is In Act 
   The embryo’s metaphysical feature of being in potency to a human 
being gives us some important information. If the embryo is just from 
the beginning oriented to become a human being, the embryonic 
matter – and every substitution of its parts and modification of its 
quantity – must be made in such a way to undergo a progressive and 
suitable process of organization that makes it able to support the 
functions finally performed by the human soul. This teleology also 
regulates the embryo’s passing from one form to another. One may 
say that it is one and the same embryo in number that is being 
perfected because each of its forms is oriented toward a subsequent 
form that, while replacing the preceding form, perfects it and 
reabsorbs into itself the vital functions carried out by it. This gradually 
                                                                                                                               
rei, et quae est causa quod illa res sit una; quia unumquodque inquantum est, 
unum est, et potentia et actus quodammodo unum sunt». 
35 See AQUINAS 1964 Exp. Met., IX, lec. 7, 444, nn. 1847–1848: «Dicit ergo primo, 
quod actus est prior tempore potentia; ita tamen quod idem specie, est prius 
agens, vel ens actu quam ens in potentia; sed idem numero est prius tempore in 
potentia quam in actu. Quod sic manifestatur. Si enim accipiamus hunc hominem 
qui est iam actu homo, fuit prius secundum tempus materia, quae erat potentia 
homo. (…) Sed tamen quaedam existentia in actu fuerunt priora secundum 





perfected and human-form-oriented potentiality of the embryo to be a 
human being makes good sense of Aquinas’ presupposition that what 
is in potency and what is in act amount to one and numerically the 
same thing. 
Numerous texts of Aquinas may be quoted in support of this 
reading. For example, in the Quaestiones de virtutibus, which dates from 
the final years of his life (1271–1272), Aquinas describes the passage 
from an imperfect to a perfect form as the gradual actualization of one 
and the same subject (in number, we may suppose)36. The degrees of 
actualization of a subject are defined according to the way in which 
each degree is in potency to the immediately subsequent degree. To 
say of an act that it is in potency to another act is to say that such an 
act is not perfect. In his works, Aquinas often equates an imperfect act 
to motion, that is, to an act that is, by definition, incomplete, 
intermediate between pure potency and pure act. He argues in this 
way especially when discussing local motion in his Commentary on 
the Physics. While tackling a quite different question (namely, the 
conversion of bread into the body of Christ in the Eucharist), already 
in his Commentary on the Sentences Aquinas noted that the subject 
                                           
36  See AQUINAS 1965 Qu. de virt., q. 1, a. 11, 740: «Moveri autem de forma 
imperfecta ad perfectam, nihil est aliud quam subiectum magis reduci in actum: 
nam forma actus est; unde subiectum magis percipere [maybe for recipere] formam, 
nihil aliud est quam ipsum reduci magis in actum illius formae. Et sicut ab agente 
reducitur aliquid de pura potentia in actum formae; ita etiam per actionem agentis 




involved in an imperfect act and in a perfect act must be one and the 
same (in number, we may suppose again) 37 . Aquinas takes the 
property of “being in perfect act” as coextensive with “being in act” 
and the property of “being in imperfect act” as coextensive with 
“being in potency”. On the basis of such identifications, the unity of 
what is in potency and what is act implies the unity between what is in 
imperfect act and what is in perfect act. Such an implication could be 
enough to extend to the embryo from the moment of conception the 
numerical identity with the generated human being that the embryo 
has in its final stage, when it is in proximate potency to receive 
rational ensoulment. This extension could well account for the identity 
of the embryo from conception up to the advent of the human soul. 
If we consider things from this point of view, the condition of 
sharing one and the same being (introduced above) may be after all a 
good condition from which the identity through time of the embryo 
could be inferred. In particular, in the case of an embryo A and a 
human being B, substantial continuity tells us that A does not have its 
own being but is something in potency to being B, which expresses the 
authentic being of A. Aquinas regularly explains the relation between 
                                           
37 See AQUINAS 1947 Sup. Sent., IV, d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, q.la 1, ad 3, 446: «Ad tertium 
dicendum quod transmutatio naturalis panis ponit actum imperfectum, ut patet in 
V Physicorum, et quia idem est subiectum actus perfecti et imperfecti, ideo oportet 
quod subiectum transmutationis naturalis sit id quod est subiectum postmodum 





A and B by using the contrasting notions of imperfect/perfect, 
incomplete/complete. That A has an imperfect or incomplete form 
means that the form that can be attributed to A when A is not yet B is 
not the genuine form of A. More explicitly, to be an embryo does not 
express the complete or perfect form of an embryo, but only expresses 
an incomplete or imperfect form of being a human being, which is the 
genuine form of the embryo. Thus, the being of A is exhausted in its 
being in potency to B, and being B expresses the perfect and complete 
being of A, a being that A does not yet possess insofar as it is A, except 
in an imperfect and incomplete way. In my view, in the case of the 
embryo, substantial continuity between A and B can be restored 
precisely by the metaphysical feature of a human embryo’s being in 
potency a human being. 
5. Conclusion 
   It is time to conclude. The identity of the human embryo through 
generation is a puzzle that Aquinas seems to have some difficulties to 
solving. On the one hand, Aquinas describes human embryogenesis as 
a process formally and materially discontinuous, alternating 
incessantly generations and corruptions of the subject; on the other 
hand, however, he thinks of it as a continuous process to the extent to 
which it is supposed to be a numerically one process concerning one 
and the same subject in number. The identity of the subject of 




must not surprise us, though. The postulation of the identity of subject 
of the embryo is quite expected given the way in which Aquinas sets 
up the problem of the identity of a thing. Identity seems to be for 
Aquinas a primitive notion, not explainable by more fundamental 
notions. The identity of some thing must be presupposed in explaining 
the identity of some other thing. Specifically, in the case of human 
embryo, it is not the identity of matter and/or form that explains the 
identity of the embryo, but the vice versa holds. On Aquinas’ account 
of human embryogenesis, therefore, the problem of the identity of the 
embryo can be solved independently of the solution we may give to 
the problem of the identity of its matter and/or form. If the identity of 
the embryo is metaphysically unexplainable, for it can be guaranteed 
neither by the matter nor by the form, it is unavoidable that such an 
identity be assumed by Aquinas as a basic given. It can only be 
inferred from extrinsic (and especially cognitive or even causal) data 
such as the possibility of proving the existential continuity of the 
subject of generation or the non-interruption of the whole process, or 
even the possibility of following step-by-step the development of the 
embryo and of reconstructing it in any phase.38  
                                           
38 See e.g. Scriptum super Sententiis, III, d. 21, q. 2, a. 4, q.la 1 and ad 1. See also 
Scriptum super Sententiis, IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, q.la 2 and ad 2, for the connection 
between numerical identity of a subject and continuity and/or lack of interruption 
of its being. For an explanation of the numerical identity of a subject in terms of 
the identity of its properties of origin, see AQUINAS 1996 Quodl., V, q. 5, a. 1, vol. 2, 




More particularly, as has been seen, the identity of the embryo is 
justified by the identity entailed by the metaphysical notions of 
potency and act. Since Aquinas regularly describes generation as a 
process of perfecting, i.e., as the motion of a subject from an imperfect 
state to a perfect one, from incompleteness to completeness in being, 
necessarily one and the same thing in number has to be the subject that 
undergoes such a process.  
In conclusion, if our analysis is correct, we may state that what 
Aquinas would have been really looking for was only a metaphysical 
condition that could enable us to establish the identity of the embryo 
and, on the cognitive level, to infer and ascertain it.  
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aliorum animalium semen patris sit agens, materia uero a matre ministrata sit 
sicut paciens ex quo corpus humanum formatur, inpossibile est eundem filium 
nasci siue sit alius pater siue sit alia mater; sicut etiam non est idem numero 
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